Economic and Social Integration of Migrants and Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon

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Introduction

Jordan and Lebanon are two of the largest recipients of Syrian refugees. The refugee flow to both countries started at the beginning of the Syrian crises and has continued until today. The estimated number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is about 1,048,275 (UNHCR, 2016a), constituting 25% of the Lebanese population. The Jordanian government 2015 census found that the number of Syrian refugees in Jordan is 1.4 million (13% of the total population), out of which 655,217 are registered with UNHCR. Unlike Lebanon, Jordan has three major and two minor Syrian refugee camps that currently host 137,068 refugees (UNHCR, 2016b), which amounts to approximately 16% of the total Syrian refugees in the country. The remaining 84% of refugees are living outside the camps amongst the host community.

Jordan can be characterised as a country of refugees and migrants. Currently, in addition to the Syrian refugees, there are more than a quarter million refugees from other countries. The first wave of refugees were Palestinians that first arrived in 1948 and then in 1967. Hundreds of thousands fled the wars in Palestine in search of a better life in Jordan. Furthermore, in 1991-1992 after Iraq invaded Kuwait, more than three million refugees crossed the borders to Jordan. The second big wave of refugee arrivals took place after the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Syrians now represent the largest group of refugees in Jordan. Additionally, Jordan hosts more than 600,000 Egyptian migrant workers. The refugees and migrants in Jordan make up 30% of the overall population of the country.

Lebanon has a similar history of refugee and migrant influxes. The first wave of refugees in Lebanon was in 1948, when more than 100,000 Palestinians fled to Lebanon and were accommodated in refugee camps (Amnesty International, 2007). Currently, it is estimated that the number of Palestinian refugees amounts to approximately 449,957 (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East [UNWRA], 2014). However, the Syrian refugee influx into Lebanon is the most substantial in terms of its ratio to the total population, accounting for around 25%.

In the light of these figures, the question of the social and economic integration of refugees and migrants in Jordan and Lebanon is of the utmost importance.

This part of the Joint Policy Study will first analyse the socioeconomic characteristics of refugees in both countries. Secondly, the economic impact of the refugees, with a

particular focus on the impact on the labour market and social relations between the refugees and host communities will be examined. The chapter will then focus on the policies implemented in order to meet the immediate needs of refugees and those pursued to mitigate the impact of the refugee influxes on the local population. The last part of this chapter will discuss the lessons learned and formulate some recommendations for future policies that may be adopted by both refugee host countries and the international community in order to deal more adequately and efficiently with the refugee crisis and mitigate its effects in Jordan and Lebanon.

The analysis conducted in this chapter is based on the data produced by international organisations and by the Lebanese and Jordanian governments. Additionally, data from the surveys conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies on Syrian refugees in Jordan and the surveys conducted on the Syrian refugees in Lebanon will be included.

Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Syrian Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon

As mentioned above, Jordan and Lebanon have received the highest number of Syrian refugees in the world. In the case of Jordan, the number of the Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR is 655,217 (UNHCR, 2016b). However, it is estimated that the total number of Syrian refugees, including the unregistered ones, is actually around 1.26 million out of a total population of around 9.5 million (Ghazal, 2016). The number of new arrivals each year has followed an increasing trend since 2011, reaching its peak between 2012 and 2013 with 309,720 new registered refugees. From 2014 to 2015, the trend decreased, as 82,422 and 27,205 of Syrian refugees were registered respectively in these years. According to the Jordan Response Plan 2016-2018, the number of refugees is supposed to be stable and constant over the coming period (Jordan Response Plan [JRP], 2015).

The distribution of the refugees in the Hashemite Kingdom is uneven, as the more conspicuous part of them is located in the northern areas, close to the Syrian border. The Syrian refugees in Jordan are divided into those living in refugee camps and those living in camps in predominantly urban areas.

A large number of refugees are residing in the Irbid (23.5%) and Mafraq (26.1%) districts. However, the greatest concentration of refugees is registered in Amman (27.4%), probably due to the fact that it has the capacity to host such a massive number of newcomers (Figure 1), meaning an adequate infrastructure, such as sufficient water supplies, education, health services, housing, and work opportunities.

In Lebanon, the number of Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR is 1,048,275 (UNHCR, 2016a). Lebanon also faces the largest concentration of refugees in the Syrian border area. Beqaa is the region where the most significant concentration of the refugees (35.8%) is reported (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Distribution of Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon



Distribution of Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon, 2011-2014 (%) (produced based on: Verme, P., Gigliarano, Ch., Wieser, Ch., Hedlund, K., Petzoldt, M., & Santacroce, M., 2016)

Regarding the age distribution of refugees, in Jordan and Lebanon, youth constitutes the largest group. In Jordan, young people (0-24) account for almost 65% of all the refugees in the country (Figure 2). Likewise, in Lebanon the youngest cohort (0-24) amounts to around 64% of all the refugees (Figure 3).

Figure 2. Syrian refugee age distribution in Jordan



Syrian refugee age distribution in Jordan (produced based on: Verme, P., Gigliarano, Ch., Wieser, Ch., Hedlund, K., Petzoldt, M., & Santacroce, M., 2016)

Figure 3. Syrian refugee age distribution in Lebanon



Syrian refugee age distribution in Lebanon (produced based on: Verme, P., Gigliarano, Ch., Wieser, Ch., Hedlund, K., Petzoldt, M., & Santacroce, M., 2016)

Another key variable to be analysed is the education level of the refugees, especially considering its relation to employment possibilities. In Jordan, the majority of Syrian refugees have completed the first and second stage of primary education (71.2%), whereas only 3.7% have a university degree or higher (Figure 4). The level of education

is explained by the fact that almost 46% of the total population of Syrian refugees are aged 0-14 years. Moreover, presumably, young people aged 15-24 years could not have access to higher education, due to the outbreak of war.

Figure 4. Education rates of Syrian refugees in Jordan



Education rates of Syrian refugees in Jordan (produced based on: Verme, P., Gigliarano, Ch., Wieser, Ch., Hedlund, K., Petzoldt, M., & Santacroce, M., 2016)

Figure 5. Education rates of Syrian refugees in Lebanon



Education rates of Syrian refugees in Lebanon (produced based on: Verme, P., Gigliarano, Ch., Wieser, Ch., Hedlund, K., Petzoldt, M., & Santacroce, M., 2016)

Education rates of Syrian refugees settled in Lebanon show a similar pattern (Figure 5). 76.1% of refugees have completed primary level of education. A very small percentage

of refugees received a secondary or a university degree before moving to the host country (13.3%). In the case of Syrian refugees both in Jordan and Lebanon, more men than women have university degrees or higher. Finally, it is worth noting that the proportion of women with no education is higher than that of men: 14.1% and 8.2%, respectively, in the case of Jordan, and 9.2% and 5.2% in the case of Lebanon.

These education rates raise the question of whether or not education level is reflected in the type of employment of the refugees in Jordan and Lebanon. As depicted in Figure 6 and Figure 6.1, most of the refugees do not work in the same profession as they did before immigrating. In the case of female refugees, before leaving Syria, they were mostly employed as professionals (lawyers, doctors and similar high-skilled jobs), skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers and clerical support workers. Currently, the most common employment (around 90%) for female refugees in Jordan and in Lebanon is as service and sales workers. As far as male refugees are concerned, the distribution between the distinct employment sectors is more diversified. Around 69% of male Syrian refugees were previously employed as plant and machine operators, service and sales workers and skilled agricultural workers. Currently, nearly half of the male refugees in Lebanon are taking up elementary occupations[1] (45%), whereas the majority of male refugees in Jordan are craft and trade workers (over 30%).

Figure 6. Women



Employment of Syrian refugees before and after reaching the host countries (produced based on: Verme, P., Gigliarano, Ch., Wieser, Ch., Hedlund, K., Petzoldt, M., & Santacroce, M., 2016)

1 Low-skilled jobs were classified in the source report as cleaners, food preparation assistants and similar.

Figure 6.1 Men



Employment of Syrian refugees before and after reaching the host countries (produced based on: Verme, P., Gigliarano, Ch., Wieser, Ch., Hedlund, K., Petzoldt, M., & Santacroce, M., 2016)

The predominance of these types of employment among the male refugees may be explained by two facts. First, as stated in the previous section, the majority of the refugees are young people who have only completed primary level education. Second, both in Jordan and in Lebanon, Syrian refugees are struggling to get work permits due to internal barriers posed by the long process involved. Therefore, refugees are forced to seek employment in the informal economy, where jobs are underpaid and working conditions are detrimental. Preventing access to skilled occupations and some sectors of the economy may cause frustration among Syrian refugees, leading to tensions with the host community. In addition, it may have a negative impact on the future reconstruction of Syria, where high-skilled workers will be needed.

The difficult situation in terms of access to the labour market raises the question of why, despite this fact, Syrians decide to immigrate to Jordan and Lebanon. According to a survey conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies, 79% of Syrian refugees claimed that they had a previous connection in Jordan (usually a member of a family) before moving to the host country (CSS, Mercy Corps & UK FCO Conflict Pool, 2015). This clearly shows how social networks are relevant in choosing the destination country, as they provide a kind of sense of security, at least for the first months of stay.

Managing everyday life represents the most serious difficulty that Syrian refugees have to deal with following their decision to move to a host country. However, a distinction

should be made between the refugees settled in the camps and the other refugees (registered and unregistered) living in urban and rural areas in Jordan and Lebanon. This is because refugees who live in the camps are provided with direct services, while the refugees residing in the cities must access urban services, guaranteed to the whole population. The urbanised refugees represent 84% of Syrian refugees in Jordan, while the remaining 16% live in the refugee camps such as Za'atari, Marjeeb al-Fahood, Cyber City, King Abdullah Park and Al-Azraq.

As mentioned above, Syrian refugees in Jordan were not eligible to receive a work permit until recently. Therefore, most of them work in informal sectors. Their main official income consists of in-kind support provided by the Jordanian government within specific voucher programmes supported by several INGOs, i.e. UNICEF, UNHCR, and WFP (UNHCR, 2014; Barakat, Khoury, Davies & Hammad, 2015). The vouchers can be spent on all the basic necessities, including food, clothes, furniture, kitchen equipment, rent, transportation and bills. The monthly amount ranges from 50 JOD to 120 JOD (65 to 156 Euros), depending on the family size and needs. This amount is around the poverty line, corresponding to 68 JOD per person per month. Refugees also have access to free health service and public education. The financial help, however, is insufficient to cover the basic needs, leading the refugees to enact coping strategies.

In the case of the refugees living outside the camps, the most significant expenditure is rent, followed by utilities, food, transport and education for children (Barakat, Khoury, Davies & Hammad, 2015). Sharing a flat is a usual practice adopted by 92% of elderly-headed households (60+) and by 50% of households headed by refugees between the ages of 18 and 35 years (UNHCR, 2014). In the case of Lebanon, the majority (two-thirds) of refugees live in single family housing, while only one third of refugees live in shared housing (Alsharabati & Nammour, 2015).

Other common coping mechanisms also consist of reducing the quality and quantity of food (50% and 43% of refugees respectively admit doing so), reducing the accommodation costs (almost 50%) and reducing heath expenditures (25%) (UNHCR, 2014). These types of coping strategies could potentially lead to a serious increase of vulnerability and health deficiencies in the long term. Moreover, even if the Jordanian government ensures free access to education, 12% of respondents admitted that one of the coping strategies is also withdrawing children from school and 6% resorting to child labour as a coping strategy (UNHCR, 2014). Overall, the level of satisfaction with the aid received is very low. In the case of Jordan, only 32% of refugees living inside camps and 18% of those living outside consider the government help to be sufficient (Figure 7) (Shteiwi, Walsh & Klassen, 2014).

Figure 7. Syrian refugee satisfaction with aid received



Syrian refugee satisfaction with aid received (produced based on: Shteiwi, Walsh & Klassen, 2014)

If the voucher programmes were interrupted, 20% of refugees would consider leaving Jordan for Europe (20%) or returning to their home country (26%) (Figure 8) (WFP, 2015).

Figure 8. Potential movement by vulnerable families



Potential movement by vulnerable families (produced based on: World Food Programme [WFP], 2015)

Other research (Center for Strategic Studies [CSS], 2015) opened the reflection on the need to explore not only Syrian refugee life expectations in terms of potential movement to other countries but also in terms of the drivers of this decision and, in particular, the

role of social networks in choosing or moving to the final destination. A significant number of Syrian refugees interviewed who are currently settled in Jordan would intend to return to their home country in the case of a ceasefire (36.9%) or a political solution (31.8%). Further motivations, such as aid cuts or lack of job opportunity in the host country, appear less likely to result in Syrian refugees returning to Syria. Respectively, only 2.9% and 3.7% of the sample would return to their home country if any type of economic support is cut or in the case of lack of jobs in Jordan (Figure 9).

Figure 9. Which circumstances would encourage you to return to Syria?



Life expectations concerning relocation for Syrian refugees in Jordan (Center for Strategic Studies [CSS], 2015)

In more general terms, most Syrian refugees interviewed (70%) explicitly reject the idea of migrating to Europe (Figure 10).

Figure 10. Are you or one of your family members thinking of migrating to Europe?



Syrian refugee intentions to relocate to Europe (CSS, 2015)

While analysing the role of social networks in driving migrant movements, the research showed that the majority of the sample (66%) does not have any relative living in Europe (Figure 11).

Figure 11. Do you have any relative who migrated to Europe?



Syrian refugee relatives in Europe (CSS, 2015)

This data might explain why most Syrian refugees do not conceive Europe as a possible destination to relocate to. The results show that more in-depth research is needed on the role of the social network in choosing the migration destination.

Response Plans

Legal Framework

Both Jordan and Lebanon are signatories to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but not to the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. Neither Jordan nor Lebanon have an explicit law to address issues related to refugees, which is why refugees are treated as foreign or Arab nationals. When the Syrian crisis erupted, Syrians were allowed to enter Jordan without any restrictions, except for security considerations. At first, informal measures were taken to accommodate the refugees, but the situation changed as the influx of refugees continued to increase. Later on, UNCHR established its operations in the country, the Syrian refugees started to be registered, and the refugee camps were set up, with Al-Za'atari being the first and the largest, currently hosting around 80,000 refugees (UNHCR, 2016b).

In the case of Lebanon, in January 2015, the government implemented a new border policy that bars Syrians from entering Lebanon on a merely humanitarian basis. Instead, Syrians at the borders are asked to justify the reason for their travel to the country, whether for work, trade, transit or tourism. In addition to the closure of borders to Syrians displaced on a humanitarian (as refugee) basis, the government has recently requested the UNHCR to stop registering refugees. This measure could backfire on Lebanon's interests. Closing the registration process will render the refugees "invisible", highly vulnerable, and also less and less accountable to the Lebanese authorities, which can only benefit from clear and transparent records of a Syrian presence in Lebanon.

In 2015, both countries adopted a resilience-based approach to respond to and mitigate the effects of the Syrian crisis on host communities in Jordan and Lebanon. The main aims of the response plans are firstly to ensure the protection of the Syrian refugees and the vulnerable parts of Jordanian and Lebanese society and, secondly, to strengthen the capacity to be able to deal appropriately and more efficiently with the refugee crisis.

The Jordan Response Plan of 2015 and the Lebanese Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) implement a series of policies in coordination with international agencies and other governments that include the following:

First, the initial response of both countries was to meet the basic human needs of the refugees such as housing, food, health and education for all refugees, whether in or outside the camps. Meeting the humanitarian needs of the refugees was achieved through international and national organisations in cooperation with the governments. In Jordan, three camps were set up to accommodate the most vulnerable refugees, the largest being Al'-Za'atari camp, and two smaller camps. However, the camps have a limited capacity to accommodate the growing number of refugees. Therefore, the rest of the refugees are living in the various cities and towns of the country. Refugees are allowed to leave the camps to reside outside in certain circumstances.

Unlike Jordan, Lebanon did not allow the building of Syrian refugee camps. Thus, the refugees stay in communities and Palestinian camps across the country, with the main concentration in Sunni-dominated areas. Assistance and protection are provided to refugees in their communities.

Second, the presence of a large number of Syrian refugees has put great pressure on the organisational capacity and financial resources of the governments; both plans needed direct financial support for the budget from the international community to cover

the cost of additional services and infrastructures related to the refugees, both at the national and local levels. Those include community services, economic recovery and infrastructures.

Third, the JRP plan includes provisions to strengthen the capacities of the main services in fields such as health, education, and water and sanitation, so as to mitigate the negative impact of the high concentrations of refugees in certain areas and cities or host communities. Likewise, the LCRP includes the expansion of energy, sanitation and clean water to vulnerable Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian populations.

Fourth, both plans aimed to strengthen the capacity of the local governments and municipalities in both countries because of the refugees' pressure on the municipal services and infrastructure that was degraded as a result of the pressure on water, housing, environment, energy and transport. The support is to be channelled to municipalities.

Fifth, both plans aimed at expanding employment opportunities for vulnerable Jordanians and Lebanese who were negatively affected by the crisis.

To sum up, the response plans of both countries are very comprehensive and include humanitarian assistance, strengthening service systems, and enhancing the government capacities at the national, regional and municipal levels. The cost of implementing the response plans, which were supposed to be covered by the international community, exceeds two billion dollars a year for each country. However, the actual financial support barely covers 30% of the estimated cost for both countries. The failure of the international community to raise funds for the host countries threatens their ability to meet the basic needs of the refugees. Given the meagre resources of both countries, there is a serious risk of humanitarian crises in both countries and deepening of their economic crises.

The Jordan Compact and the 2016 London Conference

In February 2016, the Kingdom of Jordan was represented at the international donor conference held in London. During this event, King Abdullah II gave an official address on Jordan's role in providing safety and security for the nearly 1.3 million Syrian refugees (registered and unregistered) in Jordan. The London conference resulted in the Jordan Compact, an agreement between Jordan and the international community. The approach is based on three actions:

1. Turning the Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan into a development opportunity that would attract international investors to the Kingdom and further economic ties with

the EU market, thus providing employment opportunities for both Syrian refugees and Jordanians and supporting a post-conflict economy in Syria.
2. Investing in Jordan's communities (with a focus on the resilience of host communities), by adequately funding the 2016-2018 Jordan Response Plan.
3. Sufficiently supplying Jordan with grants to meet the financial needs and sustain the economy over the next three years.

Nevertheless, two issues regarding the Jordan Compact should be better addressed, which is the feasibility of implementation and host state benefits. Feasibility of implementation depends on continued funding from the international community, which failed to fulfil its previous financial pledges to Jordan. With regard to the host state, Jordan is bound by various stipulations that must be implemented within the framework of the agreement, thus limiting the governance over these projects. One of them requires that Jordan removes work restrictions for Syrian refugees. While the intention behind that is to provide for Syrian refugees in Jordan, an equal benefit for the host population in Jordan, which has been heavily affected by the influx of the Syrian refugees, should be offered.

The Jordan Compact creates a path forward toward long-term sustainability; however, these risks must be assessed to ensure that both the Syrian and Jordanian communities are considered on an equal basis. The stipulations outlined by the international community could have a negative impact on Jordan's economy. Opening up the labour market for Syrians might place stress on the economic sectors where Jordanians are largely employed (public administration, retail, small industries, etc.). This might lead to the weakening of Jordan's economy, and thus the declining ability of the Kingdom to provide and protect the Syrian refugee and the local populations. It is imperative that these considerations be evaluated at every level of implementation of the Jordan Compact.

The Economic Impact of the Syrian Refugees

The influx of Syrian refugees into Jordan and Lebanon is having far reaching consequences for the economy of both countries. The impact seems to be more severe in Lebanon than in Jordan due to the difference in the pre-existing situation in each country, the number of refugees and the policies adopted in both countries.

JORDAN

Numerous studies have been conducted by international organisations on the impact of the Syrian refugees on Jordan.[2] Most of these studies focused on the impact of the

2 See, for example, Stave & Hillesund, 2015; Fakih & May, 2015; Davis &Taylor, 2013; Fakih & Marrouch, 2015; Harper, E., Thomas, S., & Abdel Aziz, M., 2015; Stockmore, 2016

refugees on the labour market and the working conditions of the Syrian workers. According to these studies, the impact of the Syrian refugees is multifaceted and far-reaching.

1. The growth of the informal sector

As already stated, the majority of Syrian refugees employed in Jordan occupy low-skilled jobs, with a major concentration in the agricultural and construction sectors. It is difficult to determine whether these types of employment already existed before the arrival of the Syrian refugees or have emerged as a result of government policies developed to reduce high unemployment rates before the outbreak of the Syrian crisis (Stave & Hillesund, 2015). Nevertheless, by accepting lower wages and harder working conditions, Syrian refugees are competition to Jordanians, especially youth, who might have otherwise occupied those jobs.

2. Increased competition with Jordanians for existing jobs

Another impact that the Syrian refugees are having on the labour market is competition with the Jordanian labour force on the formal market and, to some extent, replacement of Jordanian labour forces. As the crisis continues, more Syrians with different levels of skills come to Jordan and enter sectors that are normally occupied by Jordanians, thus pushing Jordanians out of the labour market. This negative impact is represented in the growing unemployment rate, which since 2011 increased from 14.5% to 22.1% in 2014. The particularly vulnerable group are the youth, aged 15-24 years, whose unemployment rate has almost doubled (from 19% to 35%) (Stave & Hillesund, 2015). This inability to enter the labour market, partially because of the influx of Syrian refugees, may lead to serious social tensions unless the government adapt concrete policies to mitigate this negative impact.

3. Crowding out in the labour market

Syrian refugees are also gradually pushing the Jordanians out from the most commonly occupied sectors, such as the construction industry, and the wholesale and retail sector. Crowding out is still rather limited, however, if not adequately addressed, it may pose a serious threat to the Jordanian labour market. Currently, most of the Syrian refugees who are registered in UNHCR receive financial help. If this kind of assistance is stopped, most of the Syrian refugees will enter the labour market, causing its saturation. In addition, it is most probable that the Syrian conflict will persist in the medium term. Therefore, Syrian refugees would need to stay and gradually establish themselves in Jordan. These two factors make crowding out in the labour market a likely development that requires immediate considerations.

4. Deterioration of working conditions

As previously mentioned, Syrians often accept underpaid jobs and unsafe working conditions. This leads not only to gradually pushing the Jordanians out of the labour market, but also causes the growth of the informal economy, thus endangering labour standards for all the workers. The informalisation of the labour market obstructs Jordanian authorities from ensuring compliance with the existing labour laws on wages and working conditions.

LEBANON

The economic impact of the Syrian refugees on Lebanon seems to be more critical than in Jordan. This is partly due to the larger number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, and also in comparison to its ratio in the total population, and the already aggravated economic situation in Lebanon, with high levels of unemployment, especially among the youth and women. The major impacts of the Syrian refugees' influx on the Lebanese labour market are:

1. Unemployment

As already stated, conditions in the Lebanese labour market were already very poor before the refugee crisis started, with high unemployment rates among the youth and dominance of low quality and productivity jobs (International Labour Organization [ILO], 2014). It is estimated that the unemployment rate was 6.2% in 2009, but unemployment among youth touched 20.2% (World Bank, 2016). The massive flows of the Syrian refugees into Lebanon have intensified the unemployment problem, especially among the youth and unskilled workers. Currently, officially, the unemployment rate is estimated at 11%. However, unofficial numbers indicate that the total unemployment rate may even reach 20%, including the refugees (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2015), and youth unemployment may stand at 34% (World Bank, 2013).

2. The growth of the informal sector

The majority of the Syrian refugees are working in exploitative and unhealthy conditions in the informal economy or as informal workers in formal enterprises (ILO, 2014). The scarcity of jobs in the labour market and considerable pressure of refugees accepting much lower wages and worse working conditions than their Lebanese counterparts is gradually leading to the expansion of the informal sector and the overall deterioration of working conditions.

3. Crowding out small business

Syrian-owned businesses (small and micro) are mostly illegal, operating without a licence and without paying taxes or rent. Therefore, they tend to sell goods at much lower prices

than businesses run by local citizens. This is causing the gradual straining of the Lebanese local economy and poses serious threats to small Lebanese businesses.

4. Child labour

Over half of the Syrian refugees in Lebanon are children (World Bank, 2015). Due to the difficult financial situation of many households, many children are obliged to work, sometimes, as street peddlers and beggars (ILO, 2014).

Social Attitudes and Perception of the Host and Refugee Communities

As briefly mentioned in the previous section, social cohesion and integration between the refugees and the host community is challenged by a continuous tension that emerges due to social perceptions of higher benefits delivered to refugees by the host countries compared to the local citizens (CSS, Mercy Corps & UK FCO Conflict Pool, 2015). Those tensions lead to increased feelings of insecurity by the Syrian refugees in the host countries. According to the survey on perceptions of Syrian refugees in Lebanon[3] (Alsharabati & Nammour, 2015), the majority of Syrian refugees do not feel welcome in their host country. 46% of the refugees admitted having faced a dangerous situation. The majority of them suffered insults and harassment from the civilians and raids and extortion from security agents (Figure 12). 69% of respondents admitted not taking any responsive action, while the remaining 21% enacted preventive strategies (Figure 12.1).

Figure 12. Syrian refugees negative action subjection



Syrian refugees in Lebanon negative action subjection and relative preventive strategies (produced based on: Alsharabati & Nammour, 2015)

3 Survey based on a total sample of 1,200 Syrians and 600 Lebanese respondents answering an adequately targeted questionnaire. Syrian refugees were selected in 120 villages sampled by UNHCR and further sampled depending upon type of residence. The Lebanese community was sampled in the same villages and neighbourhood.

Figure 12.1. What did you do?



Syrian refugees in Lebanon negative action subjection and relative preventive strategies (produced based on: Alsharabati & Nammour, 2015)

When it comes to access to services, 28% of Syrian refugees in Lebanon reported having no access at all (Figure 13). Out of those who have had access to welfare services, 37% reported different and negative treatment compared with Lebanese citizens (Figure 13.1).

Figure 13. Do you have access to services?



Syrian refugees' access to welfare services and relative treatment in Lebanon (produced based on: Alsharabati & Nammour, 2015)

Regarding employment opportunities, 45% of recruiters state that they would not hire Syrians (Figure 14). 69% of them justify this answer by saying that Syrian refugees take jobs away from Lebanese citizens (Figure 14.1).

Analogous trends are reported in the case of Jordan. Compared to 2012, welcoming attitudes towards Syrian refugees in the Hashemite Kingdom have decreased (Figure

Figure 13.1. How are you treated when you seek access to services?



Syrian refugees' access to welfare services and relative treatment in Lebanon (produced based on: Alsharabati & Nammour, 2015)

15). Social tension and potential segregation also apply to living and residential areas. 66% of Jordanians[4] admit preferring to have fellow nationals as neighbours instead of Syrian refugees, while only 32.4% state not feeling any difference between the two groups (Table 1). The same survey shows that 71.2% of Jordanians feel a decrease in safety in their country, as a result of the influx of the Syrian refugees (Table 2). Competition in the labour market is considered to be a serious problem by the host community, as 82.9% of Jordanians believe that employing a Syrian might create disputes between them and the host community (Table 3).

Figure 14. Would you hire Syrian workers?



Recruiter tendencies in hiring Syrians and relative motivations (produced based on: Alsharabati & Nammour, 2015)

4 The total number of surveyed people was 3,149 aged 18 and older. The stratified proportional sample was based on geographical and administrative divisions in the Kingdom of Jordan.

Figure 14.1. Why would you not hire Syrian workers?



Recruiter tendencies in hiring Syrians and relative motivations (produced based on: Alsharabati & Nammour, 2015)

Figure 15. As a result of the Syrian crisis, Jordan has received hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees. Do you support continuing to receive more Syrian refugees?



Jordanian community opinion about potential new migration arrivals (produced based on: Shteiwi, Walsh & Klassen, 2014)

Table 1. Jordanian and Syrian opinion about living as neighbours

Which do you prefer more, having Jordanian or Syrian neighbours?	Baseline	
	Jordanian %	Syrian %
Jordanian	66	7.2
Syrian	1.6	18.7
Does not make any difference	32.4	74.1
Total	100	100

Produced based on: CSS & Mercy Corps & UK FCO Conflict Pool, 2015

Table 2. Jordanian and Syrian opinion about perception of security in the country following the Syrian refugee's migration

Do you think that with the increase in the number of Syrian refugees the level of security in the region where you live in Jordan will decrease?	2013		2015	
	Jordanian %	Syrian %	Jordanian %	Syrian %
Yes, it will decrease	71.2	20.9	57.0	11.4
No, it will stay the same	27.0	74.4	36.5	81.5
No, it will increase	1.4	4.1	6.5	7.1
No answer	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0
Total	100	100	100	100

Produced based on: CSS, Mercy Corps & UK FCO Conflict Pool, 2015

Table 3. Jordanian and Syrian opinion about employment possibilities for Jordan and Syrian citizens

Do you think that the work of Syrians in shops and facilities might create disputes between Jordanians and Syrians?	2013		2015	
	Jordanian %	Syrian %	Jordanian %	Syrian %
Yes	82.9	57.2	65.8	45.6
No	15.8	37.6	30.2	45.1
Don't know	1.3	5.3	4.0	9.3
Total	100	100	100	100

Produced based on: CSS, Mercy Corps & UK FCO Conflict Pool, 2015

The improbability of obtaining legal employment leads most of the Syrian refugees to accept vulnerability conditions and lower wages in the informal sector, thus deteriorating the labour market and working conditions for all workers. Although currently some negative attitudes toward receiving more refugees into Jordan could be detected amongst Jordanians, the tension between members of the two communities remains very limited. However, if not adequately addressed, in the long term such a situation could degenerate into more serious social conflicts.

Recommendations

Jordan and Lebanon have endured a heavy burden by hosting Syrian refugees. The huge refugee influx due to the continuation of war in Syria has stretched the already limited resources and imposed severe stress on the economy, host communities and public

services in both countries. The international community has provided assistance to both countries, but the support covers no more than 30% of the resources needed to handle the refugee crisis. The situation is aggravated by the fact that there seems to be no near end of the Syrian war, which implies that the Syrian refugees will continue to flow to Lebanon and Jordan for the foreseeable future. The magnitude of this problem is beyond the economic capacity of these two countries. Thus, the responsibility of meeting the short- and long-term needs of the refugees should be shared with the international community. The response plans should address not only the needs of the refugees, but also those of the host communities, in order to mitigate the impact of the crisis on them and to pre-empt the development of tensions and conflicts between the host and the refugee communities.

The above considerations require a paradigm shift from the current humanitarian approach to a developmental one that focuses on creating opportunities in both countries to the host communities and the Syrian refugees. In order to address all the short- and medium-term needs and avoid the collapse of the economy of the host countries in the long term, the host countries and the international community should jointly implement a comprehensive set of policies. These might include:

1. Continue to provide humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees, especially for the most vulnerable segments of the population, such as children and women, to ensure that their basic needs are met.

2. Develop policies and programmes to stop the expansion of the informal economy in both countries with the intention of gradually formalising the informal economy, and to stop the deterioration of working conditions for refugees and Jordanian and Lebanese nationals.

3. Encourage international businesses to establish factories and businesses in the areas with a major concentration of Syrian refugees, thus creating job opportunities for refugees and host communities.

4. Encourage and provide incentives for businesses to employ both refugees and nationals, especially in newly-established business.

5. Encourage temporary employment of refugees and local community in large public projects.

6. Set up micro credit schemes and loans to Syrians and nationals, with a focus on youth and women.

7. Develop policies to fight the fast-growing child labour market, including imposing obligatory school enrolment of children into the school system.

8. Whenever possible, include refugees in the national employment and poverty alleviation programmes in both countries.

9. Improve the management of the labour market through the development of a national statistical database of working refugees.

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